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1 Introduction
When dealing with entrepreneurs, the main task of investors is to provide the
required initial capital. Recent literature however emphasizes that investors
have also an important secondary role to play (e.g. Garmaise (2001), Inderst
and Mu¨ller (2003), Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2005), Manove et. al. (2001)).
It argues that due to their experience, investors are in a better position to
judge certain aspects of a project than the entrepreneur. For instance, a bank
that finances restaurants seems in a better position to estimate the potential
demand for a new restaurant than a young, ambitious cook. Similarly, a
venture capitalist that is involved in a number of high–tech startups is better
at assessing the marketability of some additional new gadget. Indeed, exactly
because investors finance multiple, similar projects, they inevitably acquire
superior information about general economic conditions (Garmaise (2001)).
Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2005) argue therefore that outside investors “may
even be better informed” about risks that are external to the firm such as
customer adaptation, competition, and the market in general. Similarly, one
may say that investors are generally in a better position to judge the economic
viability of a project, whereas the entrepreneur is indispensable for judging
and overseeing the technical aspects of it.
This paper studies optimal financial arrangements, when investors possess
relevant, private information. It thereby focuses on the question how much
information an investor should reveal optimally. We study this problem in
a standard Jensen&Meckling type agency model of outside finance: After
the investor provides the initial investment, the entrepreneur takes some
unobservable action that influences the outcome of the project. We extend
this classical setup by private information on part of the investor. More
specifically, we assume that the investor has superior knowledge about the
state of demand that affects the project’s outcome. In order to elicit the
investor’s information the entrepreneur offers the investor a mechanism.
This paper demonstrates that, despite the relevance of the investor’s in-
formation, it may be in the entrepreneur’s best interest that the investor does
not reveal all his information. Indeed, the entrepreneur may actually benefit
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from not knowing the investor’s information at all. That is, even though the
investor’s information is valuable in principle, the information has a negative
value in equilibrium.1 The intuition behind this result is best explained by
recalling the well–known effect that the entrepreneur’s moral hazard prob-
lem leads to an undersupply of effort (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Yet,
the entrepreneur’s choice of effort will generally also depend on his beliefs
about unknown information. For instance, an entrepreneur who expects a
high demand chooses a higher effort level, because the higher demand makes
his effort more worthwhile. In this case, the investor can prevent a potential
undersupply of effort by not revealing bad news about demand conditions.
That is, upholding the entrepreneur’s belief about demand gives him enough
incentives to choose an adequate effort level. However, insulating the en-
trepreneur from bad news implies, in a rational Bayesian world, that the
investor can also not reveal too much good news, because otherwise a ratio-
nal entrepreneur would deduce the bad news indirectly. Hence, not revealing
information has the drawback that effort will be too low in the good state.
Consequently, a non–trivial trade–off obtains. The paper derives explicit
conditions under which the beneficial effect of a partial revelation outweighs
its negative effect. It thereby reveals that the trade–off is delicate. The mag-
nitude of the moral hazard problem determines whether optimal contracts
involve non, some, or a full revelation of information.
The paper is related to Inderst and Mu¨ller (2003) and Manove et. al.
(2001). These authors examine the use of the investor’s private information
as a screening device to distinguish between good and bad projects. The
current paper adheres to this view and takes it one natural step further. Once
the investor has completed her screening and concludes that the project is
worthwhile to finance, there still remains uncertainty about how good the
project actually is. That is, the fact that the investor is willing to invest
reveals some, but not all her information. Hence, when the entrepreneur
gets financed, he will know that his project is “good”, but not how good
it actually is. This paper focuses on this remaining degree of asymmetric
1The fact that an economic agent may gain when he remains uninformed is not unfa-
miliar (e.g. Kessler 1998).
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information. It asks the simple question, whether it is optimal that the
investor reveals her remaining private information, given that it is relevant
to the entrepreneur. As in Inderst and Mu¨ller (2003) it uses an optimal
contracting approach to study this question.
This paper complements the current literature on inside investors (e.g.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1997), Repullo and
Suarez (1999), and Schmidt (2003)). Also this literature assumes a more
active role for the investor, but her role relates to some activity. For example,
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Bergemann and Hege (1997) emphasize
the dynamic structure of entrepreneurial finance, where the investor has to
take multiple, finance related decisions. Whenever the investor’s decision
is not contractible, it yields a double moral hazard problem (e.g. Repullo
and Suarez (1999), and Schmidt (2003)). Rather than focusing on additional
activities of an inside investor, I extend the finance problem with private
information of the investor and thereby focus on a different aspect.
From a technical perspective this paper provides the innovation that we
analyze an adverse selection framework in which we cannot employ the rev-
elation principle. The problem which arises is that the entrepreneur, as
contract designer, chooses an unobservable action that depends on his belief.
Since a revelation of information affect these beliefs, one cannot apply the
classical revelation principle.2 Effectively, the paper considers a contracting
setting with limited commitment by the contract designer. We therefore use
a modified revelation principle developed in Bester and Strausz (2001) to
derive an optimal mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the principal–agent setup. Section 3 derives the first best solution. The
Section 4 analyze the classical setup when there is only moral hazard. Section
5 studies the problem when there is moral hazard as well as adverse selection.
Finally, Section 6 concludes. All formal proves are relegated to the appendix.
2Note that in any setup in which the revelation principle holds full information rev-
elation cannot be suboptimal. In this sense, the failure of the revelation principle is a
prerequisite for partial information revelation to be strictly optimal.
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2 The Setup
Consider an entrepreneur who has a non–scalable project that requires an
initial investment of I > 0. If the project is successful, it yields a value
of x ≡ 1. An unsuccessful project yields zero. The probability of success
is p(e, θ) ≡ eθ. That is, it increases with the entrepreneur’s effort, e, and
the state of demand, θ. Moreover, the higher the demand θ, the larger the
marginal effect of effort.3 The cost of effort is c(e) = e2/2.
Without knowing the actual state of demand, the entrepreneur is aware
that demand is high, θh, with probability ν and low, θl, with probability 1−ν,
where θh > θl. The entrepreneur therefore rationally expects a demand of
θ¯ ≡ νθh + (1 − ν)θl. An outside investor may provide the entrepreneur
with the required investment I. Since the investor has an experience with
financing similar projects, she has learned whether the state of demand is
θh or θl.
4 As the entrepreneur has no wealth, his liability is limited to zero
so that he can payback the investor only if his project succeeds. We assume
that the outcome of the project is verifiable so that a general contract can
specify a repayment, R > 0, contingent on the project being successful.
The entrepreneur and the investor are risk neutral. That is, when the
entrepreneur exerts an effort of e under the contract R then, given a state of
demand θ, the payoff of the entrepreneur and the investor are
V (e,R|θ) = θe(1−R)− c(e);
and
U(e,R|θ) = θeR− I;
respectively. Interest rates are normalized to zero.
3The multiplicative specification is the most straightforward setup that embodies these
characteristics. It yields a tractable framework in which we may derive the optimal con-
tract analytically.
4I abstract from any feedback effects of the entrepreneur’s project on the other loans
of the investor.
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We assume that the investor is privately informed about the state of de-
mand and that the entrepreneur’s effort is unobservable. That is, we study
a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard, where the two types
of asymmetric information are attributed to different parties: The entrepre-
neur’s choice of effort underlies a moral hazard problem, while the investor’s
revelation of information underlies an adverse selection problem. We further
assume that the entrepreneur has all bargaining power. That is, he makes a
take–or–leave–it offer R to the investor.
Summarizing, we will study the following sequence of events:
t=0: Nature chooses the state of demand θ ∈ {θh, θl} and informs the in-
vestor.
t=1: The entrepreneur offers a repayment schedule R(.) to the investor.
t=2: The investor accepts or rejects. If she rejects, the game ends.
t=3: The entrepreneur chooses his effort e ≥ 0.
t=4: Nature determines whether the project succeeds or fails.
Note that the investor’s private information is relevant for the entrepre-
neur. Hence, at t = 1 the entrepreneur may try to elicit the investor’s private
information by means of some mechanism. A first question that arises is
therefore what type of mechanisms one needs to consider. Since the entre-
preneur at stage t = 3 chooses some unobservable effort, we cannot use the
revelation principle to justify a restriction to mechanisms that induce truth-
ful revelation. To see that the revelation principle is not valid, observe that
the entrepreneur’s choice of effort, e, will typically depend on his information
about the state of demand θ. Hence, the standard argument that we may
replace any mechanism by a truthful one is invalid. The replacement would
change the entrepreneur’s beliefs and, thereby, his choice of effort. Effec-
tively, the revelation principle does not hold, because the entrepreneur has
limited commitment. For such frameworks Bester and Strausz (2001) develop
a modified revelation principle. There it is shown that if the mechanism de-
signer, i.e., the entrepreneur, requires the agent, i.e., the investor, to send
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a message, one may restrict attention to direct mechanisms that simply ask
the investor about her type. However, in contrast to the classical revelation
principle, the optimal mechanism may require the investor to “lie” about her
type with positive probability. Such lying represents a partial revelation of
information.
3 Full Information Benchmark
In order to develop some intuition about the model, we start with the full
information case in which both effort and the state of demand are publicly
observable.
Suppose the entrepreneur can finance the project himself and, moreover,
knows θ perfectly. In this case, the investor does not play a role and the
entrepreneur must only decide whether to invest and which effort level to
take. His payoff from investing in the project is V (e|θi) = eθi − c(e) − I.
First order conditions yield the optimal, first best effort level
e∗i ≡ θi.
This effort level yields the entrepreneur a payoff of θ2i /2 − I. Hence, in the
demand state θi the entrepreneur realizes his project if and only if I ≤ I¯∗i ≡
θ2i /2.
Now suppose there is still full information, but the entrepreneur must, due
to a lack of private funds, raise the required investment I from the investor.
Since effort is observable, a general finance contract is a pair (e,R), dictating
an effort level e and a repayment R > 0 conditional on the project being
successful. The investor accepts a contract (e,R) whenever
θieR− I ≥ 0. (1)
It follows that the optimal contract solves the following maximization
problem
max
e,R
θe(1−R)− e2/2 s.t. (1). (2)
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The solution to this problem is (e,R) = (θi, I/θ
2
i ) and yields the entrepreneur
a payoff V (θi, I/θ
2
i ) = θ
2
i /2−I. As before, the entrepreneur starts his project
whenever I ≤ I¯∗i . Despite the need for outside finance, the first best solution
is still attainable, because all information is shared symmetrically.
4 Moral Hazard Only
In this section we analyze the finance problem as a standard agency problem.
That is, we assume that the state is observable, whereas the entrepreneur’s
effort is not. Hence, the contract can condition repayments directly on the
state of demand, while it cannot condition on the entrepreneur’s choice of
effort. The effort choice underlies a moral hazard problem. It follows that
the contract has the form (Rl, Rh) and dictates a repayment Ri contingent
on the actual state being θi.
In the state θi the entrepreneur’s utility from an effort level e is
V (ei, Ri|θi) = θie(1−Ri)− e2i /2.
Hence, his optimal choice of effort is
eˆi ≡ θi(1−Ri). (3)
As is standard, the effort level eˆi is smaller than the respective first best level
e∗i , because the entrepreneur receives only a share 1 − Ri of the project’s
return.
Anticipating the effort level eˆi, an investor θi accepts a repayment Ri
whenever
Riθ
2
i (1−Ri) ≥ I. (4)
Hence, under moral hazard the entrepreneur’s optimal contract, Rmi , is a
solution to the problem
max
Ri
θiei(1−Ri)− e2i /2
s.t. (3) and (4).
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The problem admits a solution only when the required investment I is small
enough. For I ≤ θ2i /4 the solution is
Rmi ≡
(
1−
√
1− 4I/θ2i
)
/2.
Proposition 1 Assume effort is unobservable, while the state of demand is
public information. For I ≤ θ2l /4 the optimal contract is (Rml , Rmh ) and the
project is executed in both states. For I ∈ (θ2l /4, θ2h/4] the project is executed
only in state θh under the contract R
m
h . For I > θ
2/4 the project is not
executed in either state.
The proposition shows that moral hazard causes two types of inefficien-
cies. First, it leads to an undersupply of effort, because the entrepreneur
receives only a share of the return from his effort level, while incurring their
entire costs. Second, since under the first best the projects are realized for
any I ≤ θ2i /2, whereas with moral hazard the project is only executed for
I ≤ θ2i /4, underinvestment occurs for I ∈ [θ2i /4, θ2i /2]. The underinvestment
effect is due to an undersupply of effort. Since moral hazard leads to a sub-
optimally low effort level, the project’s net value is lower and, hence, it is
profitable for a smaller range of investements I.
5 Informed Investors
This section analyzes optimal contracting when both the entrepreneur’s effort
and the investor’s type are private information. Effectively, this implies that
the only contractible component is the investor’s message. Since the entre-
preneur chooses his effort after observing the message, it is unclear whether it
is optimal to induce the investor to reveal her private information truthfully.
Indeed, the entrepreneur as contract designer has limited commitment and,
as argued before, the revelation principle does not hold. However, with re-
spect to Perfect Bayesian equilibria, Bester and Strausz (2001) demonstrate
that in settings with limited commitment direct mechanisms are still optimal
but may require partial truthtelling.
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In the present framework this implies that there is no loss of generality
by focusing on a menu (Rl, Rh) which gives the investor an incentive to
report truthfully. However, in contrast to settings with full commitment, the
optimal mechanism may require partial information revelation. That is, the
optimal direct mechanism may require the investor to misreport her type
with positive probability, despite her (weak) incentive to report truthfully.
Restricting our attention to menus (Rl, Rh) the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium can be described by a combination Γ = (Rl, Rh, αl, αh, νl, νh, el, eh),
where αi describes the probability that the investor θi reports her type truth-
fully. The variable νi represents the entrepreneur’s updated belief that the
investor is of type θh given that she claimed type θi. Finally, ei describes
the entrepreneur’s choice of effort when the investor made the claim θi. In
order to constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the combination Γ has to
satisfy the following restrictions:
First, the investor must have a weak incentive to report her type truth-
fully. Hence, given the effort levels (el, eh), it must hold for type θh that
θhehRh − I ≥ θhelRl − I,
whereas for type θl it must hold
θlelRl − I ≥ θlehRh − I.
Taken together these inequalities are equivalent to the condition
elRl = ehRh. (5)
That is, the requirement that the investor must have a weak incentive to
report her type truthfully implies that she is indifferent between repayment
schedule Rh and Rl. Consequently, the condition guarantees that any re-
porting strategy αi < 1, that involves some positive probability of lying,
is also optimal. Since constraint (5) originates from the investor’s private
information, we refer to it as the adverse selection constraint.
Second, the entrepreneur’s beliefs (νl, νh) must be Bayes’ consistent with
the investor’s reporting strategy (αl, αh). That is, the beliefs νi satisfy Bayes
10
Law. This implies that
νl = νl(α) ≡ ν(1− αh)
ν(1− αh) + (1− ν)αl ; νh = νh(α) ≡
ναh
ναh + (1− ν)(1− αl) . (6)
Third, given the entrepreneur’s beliefs (νl, νh) his effort choice (el, eh)
must be optimal. His expected utility from an effort level e when he faces a
repayment R and has a belief ν˜ is
V (e|R, ν˜) = (1− ν˜)θle(1−R) + ν˜θhe(1−R)− e2/2.
Consequently, his optimal effort level is
e(ν˜, R) ≡ [ν˜(θh − θl) + θl](1−R).
It follows that the effort choice (el, eh) must satisfy
el = e(νl, Rl); eh = e(νh, Rh). (7)
The equations in (7) represent the moral hazard constraints. They describe
the entrepreneur’s unobservable behavior in response to the repayment scheme
R and his beliefs ν˜ about the investor’s private information. Quite intuitively,
the entrepreneur’s effort is increasing in his belief ν˜ and decreasing in the
repayment R.
Finally, the combination Γ must guarantee the investor her reservation
utility, since otherwise she would reject to participate. This condition trans-
lates to the individual rationality constraints
θlelRl ≥ I; θhehRh ≥ I. (8)
Summarizing, the combination Γ constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium if and only if it satisfies (5)–(8). Our task is to derive a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium that yields the entrepreneur the largest payoff. Given
an equilibrium Γ, this payoff is
V (Γ)≡ (1− ν)[αl(θlel(1−Rl)− e2l /2) + (1− αl)(θleh(1−Rh)− e2h/2)]
+ν[αh(θheh(1−Rh)− e2h/2) + (1− αh)(θhel(1−Rl)− e2l /2)].
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Figure 1: Adverse Selection and Individual Rationality Constraints.
Consequently, we solve the maximization problem:
max
Γ
V (Γ) s.t. (5)− (8).
Substitution of the moral hazard constraints (7) into the adverse selection
constraints (5) yields
(θl + νl(θh − θl))(1−Rl)Rl = (θl + νh(θh − θl))(1−Rh)Rh. (9)
Since θl < θh, the adverse selection constraints (5) imply θhehRh = θhelRl >
θlelRl. Consequently, the relevant individual rationality constraint in (8) is
θlelRl ≥ I. Substitution of the respective moral hazard constraint in (7)
transforms this individual rationality constraint into
θl(θl + νl(θh − θl))(1−Rl)Rl ≥ I. (10)
The constraints (9) and (10) play a crucial role in the analysis. Figure 1
displays, for a given reporting behavior α, the constraints graphically. The
two parabola represent the adverse selection constraints (9). The vertical
lines describe the individual rationality constraint (10). The dashed curves
illustrate two iso–utility levels of the entrepreneur. As may be expected, the
arrows indicate that his utility levels increase towards the origin. The figure
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reveals the main idea behind the subsequent analysis. The thickened parts
of the parabola describe all the combinations (Rl, Rh) that satisfy the ad-
verse selection (9) and the individual rationality constraints (10). Since the
entrepreneur’s utility increases towards the origin, the optimal repayment
schedule is located at (R∗l (α), R
∗
h(α)). However, the figure is somewhat mis-
leading, because it does not reveal that a specific reporting behavior α is only
implementable if the required investment I is small enough. The following
proposition addresses this issue and derives the optimal repayment schedule
(R∗l (α), R
∗
h(α)) analytically.
Proposition 2 A reporting strategy α is implementable if and only if
I ≤ θl(θl + νl(α)(θh − θl))/4. (11)
The optimal repayment schedule (R∗l (α), R
∗
h(α)) that induces an implementable
α is
R∗l (α) ≡
1
2
−
√
νl(α)θh + (1− νl(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
√
νl(α)θh + (1− νl(α))θl
and
R∗h(α) ≡
1
2
−
√
νh(α)θh + (1− νh(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
√
θhνh(α) + (1− νh(α))θl
.
Proposition 2 shows that a reporting strategy α is implementable if and
only if the required investment I is small relative to the equilibrium be-
lief νl(α). In particular, since νl(1, 0) = 0, full information revelation is
implementable if and only if I ≤ θ2l /4. That is, whenever I > θ2l /4 the
entrepreneur cannot induce the investor to reveal all her information. How-
ever, in this case some reporting behavior α that leads to νl(α) > 0 may
be implementable. Effectively, such reporting constitutes a partial revelation
of information. This reasoning already indicates that partial information
revelation may be optimal, simply because full revelation is impossible. In
order to determine the optimal reporting strategy among all implementable
reporting strategies, we define
I¯1 ≡ 2θhθ
2
l (2θh − θl)
(4θh − θl)2 and I¯2 ≡
2θhθlθ¯(2θh − θ¯)
(4θh − θ¯)2 .
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θ2l /4 θlθ¯/4
V r
V n
V ∗
Figure 2: Optimal reporting α∗h and the entrepreneur’s payoffs.
Proposition 3 Suppose it is optimal to ensure the investor’s participation
in both states θh and θl. Then for I ≤ I¯1 the optimal contract is full revealing
with αh = αl = 1. For I ∈ [I¯2, θlθ¯/4] the optimal contract is non–revealing
with αh = 0 and αl = 1. For I ∈ (I¯1, I¯2) the optimal contract is partially
revealing with
αl = 1 and αh =
(1− Rˆl)Rˆlθlθ¯ − I
ν((1− Rˆl)Rˆlθhθl)
∈ (0, 1).
where
Rˆl =
1
4
(
1 +
√
1− 4I/(θhθl)
)
.
The lower part of Figure 2 illustrates the proposition graphically. It
shows how the optimal revelation of information, αh, falls with the required
investment I. The upper part of the figure contrasts the entrepreneur’s
optimal payoff, V ∗, to his payoffs associated with non–revelation, V n, and full
revelation, V r. Since full revelation is only implementable for I ≤ θ2l /4, the
curve V r ends at I = θ2l /4. Likewise, the implementation of a non–revealing
contract αh = 0 is possible only for I ≤ θlθ¯/4. As stated by the proposition,
full revelation is optimal whenever I ≤ I¯1. In this case, αh = 1 is optimal
and the entrepreneur’s payoff V ∗ coincides with the full revelation payoff V r.
For I ≥ I¯2 the optimal contract induces no revelation of information. Hence,
αh = 0 and the optimal payoff V
∗ coincides with the non–revelation payoff
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V n. Finally, for the range I ∈ (I¯1, I¯2) the optimal contract induces a partial
revelation of information, αh < 1, that declines with I. In this range the
entrepreneur’s payoff V ∗ is strictly greater than the payoffs associated with
full revelation, V r, and non–revelation V n. Since I¯1 < θ
2
l /4 partial revelation
is optimal for the range I ∈ (I¯1, θ2l /4), despite the fact that full revelation is
implementable.
We now turn to the intuition behind the result that for I ≥ I¯1 the op-
timal contract induces the investor not to reveal all her information. We
start with the observation that in order for the investor to recoup her initial
investment of I, the entrepreneur must provide an adequate level of effort.
As I increases, this requirement becomes more difficult to fulfill. Moreover,
as shown in Section 4 the moral hazard problem leads to an undersupply of
effort, which makes it even harder to satisfy the requirement. The problem
exacerbates further, when the entrepreneur learns that the state of demand
is θl, because he then responds with an even lower effort level. Hence, to
reduce the tension of the payback requirement an option is to forgo on the
revelation of information. Indeed, Figure 2 illustrates that as of some level
I the entrepreneur’s payoff V n of a non–revealing contract exceeds his pay-
off V r from a full revealing contract. However, for values I ∈ (I¯1, I¯2), the
entrepreneur can do even better. Rather than restricting to full or no in-
formation revelation, the entrepreneur may induce the investor to reveal her
information partially. Given the nature of the problem, the optimal way to
do this is to reveal the good state only with a small probability αh. This
leaves the entrepreneur still uninformed about the actual state of demand
when he receives a message θl, because this message is also sent with positive
probability when the state of demand is θh. Indeed, the probability αh of
revealing the high state is kept low enough so that, when the entrepreneur
forms his rational expectation νl after receiving the message θl, he still has
enough incentives to provide an adequate level of effort.
Finally, we address the qualifier of Proposition 3 that it is optimal to
ensure the participation the investor in both states of demand. The following
proposition confirms the intuition that this is the case when the ex ante
probability, ν, is small enough. In this case, it is relatively unlikely that the
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state of demand is high so that a contract that is only accepted in this state
yields the entrepreneur rather little in expected terms.
Proposition 4 There exists some ν¯ > 0 such that for ν < ν¯ the optimal
contract induces participation of the investor in both states θl and θh.
5
Hence, for ν small enough, the contracts of Proposition 3 are indeed
optimal.
6 Conclusion
When investors possess private information about (some aspects of) an en-
trepreneur’s project, the question arises whether the investor should reveal
this information. This paper shows that, in general, such revelation is not
optimal, because it exacerbates the classical moral hazard problem in cor-
porate finance. Since the entrepreneur hold less than 100 percent of the
residual claim, while bearing the entire cost of profit enhancing activities, an
undersupply of effort occurs (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). A revelation of
the investor’s private information may exacerbate this problem and, hence,
it is suboptimal to reveal all information.
Indeed, this paper demonstrates how optimal contracts carefully calibrate
the amount of information revelation that they induce to mitigate problems
of moral hazard. Depending on the severeness of the moral hazard problem,
optimal contracts induce either partial, full, or no revelation of information.
5For the range I ∈ (I¯1, I¯2) the cutoff value ν¯ may be obtained analytically as
θlθh([(4θh−3θl)
√
1−4I/(θhθl)−4θh+5θl−2I/θh]
θlθh
[√
θ2
h
−4I−4θh+5θl+3(θh−θl)
√
1−4I/(θhθl)
]
+2I(θh−2θl)
.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Implementability of α is equivalent to the ex-
istence a combination (Rl, Rh) that satisfies (9) and (10). We show that
condition (11) is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such
a pair. From (10) it follows I ≤ (1 − Rl)Rlθl(θhνl(α) + (1 − νl)θl) ≤
(θl(θhνl(α) + (1 − νl)θl))/4. Hence, whenever (11) is violated, then (10)
is violated for any Rl. Consequently, (11) represents a necessary condition
for implementation.
Sufficiency follows from the observation that when (11) holds, then for
Rl = 1/2 inequality (10) holds. Moreover, since νh(α) ≥ νl(α) it follows that
for Rl = 1/2 one may find an Rh ∈ [0, 1/2] such that (9) holds.
To derive the optimal combination (R∗l , R
∗
h) that implements α we first
establish that, given some fixed Rl, the entrepreneur’s utility is decreasing in
Rh. This follows from a substitution of (7) and (6) into V (Γ), as this yields
dV (Γ)
dRh
= −(1−Rh)(αhθhν + (1− ν)(1− αl)θl)
2
αhν + (1− αl)(1− ν) ≤ 0 (12)
Moreover, since
dV (Γ)
dRl
= −(1−Rl)((1− αh)θhν + (1− ν)αlθl)
2
(1− αh)ν + αl(1− ν) ≤ 0, (13)
it follows that, given some Rh, the entrepreneur’s utility is also decreasing in
Rl.
From (12) it follows after solving (10) with respect to Rh that, whenever
R∗l is optimal then R
∗
h = R˜h(R
∗
l ) is optimal, where
R˜h(Rl) ≡ 1
2
−
√√√√(1− νh(α))θl + νh(α)θh − 4(1−Rl)Rl((1− νl(α))θl + νl(α)θh)
4(νh(α)θh + (1− νh(α))θl) .
Now suppose R∗l ∈ (1/2, 1] is optimal, then R∗h = R˜h(R∗l ) is optimal.
However, since R˜h(Rl) = R˜h(1 − Rl), also the combination (Rˆl, R∗h), with
Rˆl ≡ 1 − R∗l , satisfies the adverse selection constraint (9). Moreover, Rˆl
satisfies the individual rationality constraint (10) whenever R∗l does. Hence,
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also (Rˆl, R
∗
h) implements the reporting strategy α. But since Rˆl < R
∗
l it
follows from (13) that (Rˆl, R
∗
h) yields a higher utility such that R
∗
l > 1/2
cannot be optimal.
Hence, R∗l ≤ 1/2. But for Rl ≤ 1/2, the function R˜h(Rl) is increasing,
since
∂R˜h
∂Rl
=
1− 2Rl√
νh(α)θh + (1− νh(α))θl
×
νl(α)θh + (1− νl(α))θl√
(1− νh(α))θl + νh(α)θh − 4(1−Rl)Rl((1− νl(α))θl + νl(α)θh)
is non–negative for Rl ≤ 1/2. Hence, as Rl decreases also R˜h(Rl) decreases
and from (12) and (13) it follows that the entrepreneur’s utility increases.
Consequently, the optimal combination (Rl, R˜h(Rl)) is the lowest value Rl
such that the individual rationality constraint (10) is still satisfied. That is,
R∗l =
1
2
−
√
νl(α)θh + (1− νl(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
√
νl(α)θh + (1− νl(α))θl
and
R∗h =
1
2
−
√
νh(α)θh + (1− νh(α))θl − 4I/θl
2
√
θhνh(α) + (1− νh(α))θl
.
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Solving R∗h(α) and R
∗
l (α) with respect to α1
and α2 yields
α∗h(Rh, Rl) =
((1−Rh)Rhθ2l − I)((1−Rl)Rlθlθ¯ − I)
ν(Rh −Rl)(1−Rh −Rl)(θh − θl)θlI (14)
α∗l (Rh, Rl) =
((1−Rl)Rlθlθh − I)((1−Rh)Rhθlθ¯ − I)
(1− ν)(Rh −Rl)(1−Rh −Rl)(θh − θl)θlI (15)
Substitution into V (Γ) yields
Vˆ (Rh, Rl) ≡ ((1−Rh)(1−Rl)(Rh +Rl)θlθ¯ − I)I
2RhRl(1−Rh −Rl)θ2l
. (16)
18
Hence, the optimal contract is found by maximizing V (Γ) over the do-
mains
Rh ∈ Dh ≡ [Dh, Dh] ≡

1
2

1−
√
θhθl − 4I
θhθl

 , 1
2

1−
√√√√ θ¯θl − 4I
θ¯θl




and
Rl ∈ Dl ≡ [Dl, Dl] ≡

1
2

1−
√√√√ θ¯θl − 4I
θ¯θl

 , 1
2

1−
√√√√θ2l − 4I
θ2l



 .
The second order derivative is
d2Vˆ (Rh, Rl)
dR2h
=
((3/2Rh − (1−Rl))2 + 3R2h/4)((1−Rl)Rlθlθ¯ − I)I
(R3hRl(1−Rh −Rl)3θ2l )
≥ 0
where the inequality follows, because (1 − Rl)Rlθlθ¯ ≥ I for all Rl ∈ Dl.
Consequently, Vˆ (Rh, Rl) is convex in Rh so that it does not have an interior
maximum. I.e., the optimal value of Rh is either Dh or DhNote that, by (14)
and (15), the candidate Rh = Dh implies the full pooling solution ah = 1
and al = 0. Yet, since Rh = Dh and Rl = Dl also implies the full pooling
solution (with ah = 0 and al = 1), any payoff attainable with Rh = R
∗
2
is
also attainable under Rh = R
∗
1
. Consequently, we may discard the candidate
Dh and concentrate on Dh.
Taking the first order condition of Vˆ (Dh, Rl) with respect to Rl yields
R∗l =
1
4
(
1 +
√
1− 4I/(θhθl)
)
.
It satisfies the second order condition, as
∂2V
∂R2l
(Dh, R
∗
l ) = −
512(1− ν)(θh − θl)I2
θlθh
(
1−
√
1− 4I/(θhθl)
) (
1 +
√
1− 4I/(θhθl)
)4 < 0.
Hence, R∗l is optimal whenever, it lies in the domain Dl. Straightforward
calculations yield
R∗l ≥ Dl ⇔ I ≥ I¯1 and R∗l ≤ Dl ⇔ I ≤ I¯2.
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(To see that I¯2 > I¯1 note that Sign[I¯2− I¯1] = Sign[8(2− ν)θ2h +3(1− ν)θ2l −
θhθl(5 + 11(1− ν))]. The sign of the last expression is positive if and only if
ν < 1 + (θh(8θh − 5θl))/((8θh − 3θl)(θh − θl)) which holds for any ν ∈ [0, 1].)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
For I ∈ [I¯1, I¯2) it follows from Proposition 3 that the entrepreneur’s
optimal payoff from ensuring the participation of both types of investors is
V ∗ = θh(θh−5(1−ν)(θh−θl))+ 1
4
(θh+3(1−ν)(θh−θl))
√
1− 4I/(θhθl))− Iθ¯
2θl
.
For I > [I¯2, θlθ¯/4] it follows from Proposition 3 that the entrepreneur’s opti-
mal payoff from ensuring the participation of both types of investors is
V ∗ =
1
4
(
θ¯2 + θ¯
√
θ¯2 − 4Iθ¯/θl − 2Iθ¯/θl
)
.
The optimal contract when there is only participation of the θh investor
coincides with the optimal contract in Proposition 1, because in any such
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium the Bayes’ consistent belief, νe, of the entre-
preneur after an acceptance of the contract is 1. Consequently, the payoff
associated with this contract is
V h ≡ 1
4
(
θ2h + θh
√
θ2h − 4I − 2I
)
ν.
For ν = 0 it holds V h = 0 < V ∗. Since V h and V ∗ are continuous in ν it
follows that V ∗ > V h for ν > 0 small enough.
Q.E.D.
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